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THE PROBLEM WITH SOCIAL TRINITARIANISM: 
A REPLY TO WIERENGA 
Jeffrey E. Brower 
In a recent article, Edward Wierenga defends a version of Social 
Trinitarianism according to which the Persons of the Trinity form a unique 
society of really distinct divine beings, each of whom has its own exemplifica-
tion of divinity. In this paper, I call attention to several philosophical and the-
ological difficulties with Wierenga's account, as well as to a problem that such 
difficulties pose for Social Trinitarianism generally. I then briefly suggest 
what I take to be a more promising approach to the Trinity. 
In a recent article, "Trinity and Polytheism," Edward Wierenga claims to 
develop a form of Social Trinitarianism that is both theologically and philo-
sophicallyacceptable.! The account is theologically acceptable, he suggests, 
because it (i) avoids the heresy of modalism (i.e., the view that there is only 
one person in God), (ii) avoids the heresy of polytheism (Le., the view that 
there is more than one God), and (iii) fits well with traditional formulations 
of the doctrine such as the Athanasian Creed. He suggests that the account 
is philosophically acceptable because it renders the Trinity logically coherent 
and does so without going to extreme lengths such as denying the identity 
of indiscernibles or rejecting the classical notion of identity in favor of some 
form of relative identity. 
I agree with Wierenga that his account of the Trinity is logically coher-
ent and avoids at least one of the standard Trinitarian heresies, namely, 
modalism. Nonetheless, he is wrong to suppose either that his account fits 
well with traditional formulations of the doctrine or that it succeeds in 
avoiding polytheism. Indeed, it seems to me that, like those accounts of 
the Trinity that Wierenga criticizes, his own account is guilty of going to 
extreme lengths to render the doctrine coherent. In what follows, I under-
take to defend these claims and, on the basis of my defense, to identify a 
problem for Social Trinitarianism generally. I conclude by providing a 
brief sketch of what I take to be a much more promising strategy for mak-
ing sense of the Trinity. 
I. Wierenga's Account of the Trinity 
As Wierenga points out, traditional formulations of the Christian doctrine 
of the Trinity require us to accept each of the following claims:2 
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(1) There are three really distinct Persons-Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit. 
(2) Each of the Persons is God. 
(3) There is only one God. 
As he also points out, the problem with these claims is that their conjunc-
tion appears to be incoherent. Claims (1) and (2) appear to entail polythe-
ism, whereas claim (3) explicitly denies it. In developing his account of the 
Trinity, Wierenga offers an interpretation designed to show that, despite 
appearances, the conjunction of these claims is perfectly intelligible. 
The key to Wierenga's account lies in his interpretation of the second 
claim. As he sees it, claim (1) may be taken straightforwardly to deny the 
identity of the Persons of the Trinity: the Father is not identical with the 
Son, and the Holy Spirit is not identical with the Father or the Son. 
Likewise, claim (3) may be taken straightforwardly to assert the truth of 
monotheism: there exists one and only one God. It is only claim (2), he 
suggests, that requires any significant elucidation. 
Although it is natural to read (2) as asserting the identity of each of the 
Persons with God, Wierenga thinks that it should not be interpreted in this 
way. On the contrary, he says that it should be interpreted as predicating a 
certain property of Persons. Even here, however, he thinks we must be 
careful. For the property being predicated is not deity (i.e., the property of 
being a God), but divinity (i.e., the property of being divine)-where he con-
ceives of divinity and deity as distinct properties. That is to say, Wierenga 
thinks that (2) is best interpreted as the claim that: 
(2*) Each of the Persons is divine. 
It is not hard to appreciate the motivation for this interpretation. If it is 
correct, and there really is a distinction to be drawn between divinity and 
deity, then the conjunction of (1)-(3) no longer seem so problematic. For as 
Wierenga points out, we can now multiply divine beings without multi-
plying Gods. Indeed, as he sees it, claims (1) and (2) are best understood as 
asserting the existence of three divine beings, whereas (3) is best under-
stood as asserting the existence of a single deity or God, with the result that 
"the number of distinct divine persons is three; the number of Gods is one."3 
Of course, this interpretation places significant weight on the distinction 
between the property of being divine and that of being a God. But how exact-
ly are we to understand that distinction? After all, one might have thought 
that every divine person is a God, and vice versa. In response, Wierenga 
has the following to say: "a person is divine just in case that person has the 
divine attributes" -that is, just in case that person possesses such proper-
ties as omnipotence, omniscience, being uncreated, eternal, and so on" By 
contrast, he says: "[a person] is a God just in case it is God"-that is, just in 
case it is identical with God.s On Wierenga's account, therefore, to say that 
there are three really distinct divine persons but only one God is just to say 
that, although there are three really distinct beings each of whom possesses 
the properties of being all-powerful, all-knowing, uncreated, etc., there is 
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only one thing-the complex of which these three distinct beings are the 
constituents-that possesses the property of being identical with God. 
II. Problems with Wierenga's Account 
With this understanding of Wierenga's account in hand, we can now turn 
to its evaluation. As I have already indicated, I don't think there is any-
thing obviously absurd or logically incoherent about Wierenga's account. 
Indeed, if the coherence of his distinction between divinity and deity is 
granted, then his account clearly avoids the charge of modalism (since it 
entails the existence of three distinct Persons in God, which is precisely 
what the modalist denies). Even so, it still falls far short of the theological 
and philosophical adequacy that he claims for it-as I shall now argue. 
2.1 Theological Problems. To begin, let us consider how Wierenga's account 
fits with the Athanasian Creed, which he rightly takes to be representative 
of traditional formulations of the doctrine of the Trinity. As we have seen, 
Wierenga thinks that claims such as (2) are most naturally interpreted 
along the lines of (2*). Thus, when the Athanasian Creed states 'Ita deus 
Pater, deus Filius, deus Spiritus sanctus' (liThe Father is God, the Son is God, 
and the Holy Spirit is God"), he claims that lithe most plausible way to 
interpret it ... is to take the first noun, 'deus' as expressing a property of the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. That property is most naturally taken 
to be divinity, the property of being divine."6 
Even if we grant that the term 'deus' or 'God' in such contexts expresses 
a property possessed by each of the Persons of the Trinity, it is extremely 
implausible to say that the property it expresses is divinity, where this is to 
be understood as a property distinct from deity. If there really were a dis-
tinction to be drawn between divinity and deity, and if the Creed writers 
really intended to be predicating divinity rather than deity of the Persons, 
wouldn't we have expected them to use the Latin term' divinus' rather than 
'deus'? At one point in his discussion, Wierenga addresses the worry that 
"if the Latin had intended to make a predication [rather than an identity 
statement], it could have used the adjective 'divinus' [rather than 'deus']."7 
Evidently, however, he does not recognize that a similar worry can be 
raised against his own final interpretation. 
Of course, one could reply that the use of the term 'deus' in the Creed is 
a mere slip. But that, too, seems implausible. If the individual or individu-
als responsible for framing the Athanasian Creed really had in mind a 
sharp distinction of the sort Wierenga is imagining, wouldn't they have 
been careful to employ it, especially in writing a Creed? Moreover, given 
that the use of 'deus' is not restricted to the Athanasian Creed, but is part-
and-parcel of traditional formulations of the Trinity, the suggestion that the 
use of the term deus is a slip is all the more implausible. Surely, not all the 
Creed writers are guilty of the same mistake. 
It is significant, I think, that even if the Creed writers had employed' divi-
nus', where they actually have 'deus', we would still have grounds for 
rejecting Wierenga's interpretation. Judging by the way these terms are 
used in Latin, there is no sharp distinction to be drawn between the prop-
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erty of being divine (divinus) and that of being a God (deus). Indeed, the 
terms 'divinus' and 'deus' seem to me to function in Latin in much the way 
that 'human' and 'man' function in English (at least when the term 'man' is 
being used gender neutrally, for example, to translate the Latin term 
'homo'). In English, the terms 'human' and 'man' differ grammatically, and 
perhaps also in certain of their connotations; nonetheless, they express the 
same properties. To be human just is to be a man (in the gender neutral or 
archaic sense of the term). The case is much the same with divinus and 
deus: to be divine (divinus) just is to be a God (deus). But if this is right, then 
attributing a sharp distinction between divinity and deity to the individuals 
responsible for the traditional formulations of the Trinity is no more plausi-
ble than attributing a sharp distinction between being human and being a 
man to ordinary speakers of English (or even English-speaking philoso-
phers and theologians). 
It turns out that Wierenga's interpretation of (2) is not the only aspect of 
his account that conflicts with the Athanasian Creed. As some of the other 
passages quoted in his paper make clear, the Creed requires us to accept 
not only that each of the persons is God, but also that 
(4) Each of the persons is almighty and eternal, and 
(5) There are not three almighties, nor three eternals.8 
On their most natural interpretation, these sorts of claims appear to assert 
the following: although each of the Persons has the divine attributes, it is 
not the case that each has its own distinct exemplification of them. Thus, 
just as there are not three Gods, but only one God, so too, there are not three 
exemplifications of being almighty or being eternal, but only one exemplifi-
cation of each. And yet it is hard to see how Wierenga can account for this. 
As we have seen, in order to explain how each of the persons is God, and 
yet that there is only one God, he denies that the term 'God' strictly applies 
to the persons at all. Thus, when the Creed says that each of the persons is 
God, Wierenga takes this to mean that each of them is divine. This strategy 
won't work, however, in the case of the divine attributes. According to 
Wierenga, each of the persons literally has each of the divine attributes (this 
is precisely what makes them divine). But this already commits him to the 
existence of three almighties and three eternals, as well as three exemplifica-
tions of every other such divine attribute. Indeed, on his account, it is hard 
to see how anything other than the persons exemplify the divine attributes, 
except in some wholly derivative sense. 
For all these reasons, I think there is a genuine question whether 
Wierenga's account can be thought of as providing even a consistent inter-
pretation of traditional formulations of the Trinity, not to say the best or 
most natural interpretation of them. For on his interpretation, the tradi-
tional claim at (2) conflicts with that at (5). 
A further problem concerns the orthodoxy of Wierenga's account. 
Orthodoxy requires us to say that God is divine being. But if Wierenga is 
right, and only the Persons can literally be said to have the divine attribut-
es, then there is a perfectly good sense in which God is not divine on his 
account. Of course, he could respond by pointing out that there is a deriv-
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ative sense in which God is divine (since God is composed of three divine 
individuals who are literally divine). Perhaps he will say that this is all 
that's required to make sense of orthodoxy. It is not clear to me that this 
response is adequate.9 But even if it were, it would not remove the threat 
of unorthodoxy. Indeed, it would seem to exacerbate it. For if God is 
divine, where God is understood as complex distinct from but composed 
of the divine Persons, then it would follow that there are four divine 
beings. But such a view certainly seems polytheistic-indeed, tetra-theistic 
as opposed to just tri-theistic. 
This objection brings us to what is, perhaps, the chief theological diffi-
culty with Wierenga's account. Wierenga is, of course, at pains to show 
that his account can avoid the charge of polytheism, on the grounds that 
while it allows for more than one divine being it admits the existence of 
one and only one God. His defense, however, assumes that polytheism is 
just the view that there are multiple Gods in his technical sense of 'God'. 
In this sense, as we have seen, 'God' applies only to that which is identical 
with God. But, then, as Wierenga understands it, polytheism is logically 
impossible and hence trivially false, since it is logically impossible for more 
than one thing to be identical with God. Needless to say, this understand-
ing of polytheism marks a fairly radical departure from the traditional 
understanding of that view. As I pointed out earlier, there is no evidence 
to suggest that the early Church fathers would accept any sharp distinction 
between being a God and being divine. On the contrary, they would appear 
to think of multiple Gods as requiring the existence of multiple divine 
beings. Moreover, the Creeds themselves seem to presuppose that poly-
theism is logically, or at least conceptually, possible. After all, it is not as if 
claims such as" And yet there are not three Gods, but there is one God" are 
naturally interpreted to mean II And yet there are not three things identical 
to God (because that's absurd), but only one thing identical to God"! All of 
this suggests that Wierenga's defense does nothing to remove the charge of 
polytheism as polytheism is traditionally understood. 
But perhaps it will be said that there is a way to reconcile Wierenga's 
account with the more traditional understanding of polytheism. For it 
always possible to distinguish being a God (with a big 'g') from being a god 
(with a little 'g') and then take polytheism to be the view that there are 
many (little 'g') gods-that is, many gods of the sort spoken about in ancient 
Greece and Rome (i.e., non-supreme beings). The early Church fathers and 
Creed writers would certainly have opposed polytheism in this sense. But, 
then, isn't this understanding of polytheism sufficient to show that 
Wierenga's account can avoid the kind of polytheism that Christians have 
historically wanted to resist? 
Here again, I think the answer must be 'no'. Although the early Church 
and Creed writers were, no doubt, opposed to polytheism of this sort, it 
does not appear to be the only-or even the primary-target of their oppo-
sition, at least in such documents as the Athanasian Creed. For if it were, 
we would be forced to say that there is an equivocation on the term 'God' 
in claims such as "And yet there are not three Gods, but there is one God". 
But this seems implausible. The fact that such documents commonly 
speak of monotheism and polytheism in the same breath strongly suggests 
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that they take these views to be species of the same genus-namely, the-
ism-where this understood as the view that there is one or more Gods in 
some single sense of 'God'. 
In the end, therefore, it would seem that polytheism is best interpreted 
as the view that there are many divine beings, and hence that Wierenga's 
account does entail polytheism. But then, even if Wierenga's account is 
logically coherent and can avoid the charge of modaIism, it must still be 
regarded as theologically unacceptable. 
2.2 Philosophical Problems. I've already indicated why the distinction on 
which Wierenga's account turns, namely, that between divinity and deity, 
strikes me as both historically and theologically dubious. I now want to 
indicate, however, why that same distinction also seems problematic from 
a purely philosophical point of view. 
The main problem here is that the distinction itself seems entirely 
unmotivated. I, for example, cannot think of any reason for recognizing it 
apart from the desire to preserve the coherence of the Trinity. Of course, if 
recognizing this distinction were the only way to make sense of the Trinity, 
then assuming one has good reason to accept the doctrine itself, one might 
have good reason to recognize the distinction. But this is not the only way 
to make sense of the doctrine (more on this below). Moreover, given how 
artificial or unnatural the distinction itself is-as artificial or unnatural as it 
would be to distinguish the property of being human from being a man-it is 
all the more difficult to understand the motivation for introducing it. 
The lack of independent motivation for Wierenga's central distinction, 
together with the untoward theological implications it brings with it (men-
tioned in section 2.1 above), suggests a respect in which his account of the 
Trinity compares unfavorably even with those accounts that he criticizes as 
"going to extreme lengths" philosophically. Consider, for example, those 
accounts that reject the identity of indiscernibles. The rejection of this prin-
ciple may in some sense be considered extreme (though I myself do not 
think it is). And yet, at least in the case of this principle, there are indepen-
dent philosophical grounds for rejecting it. lO Indeed, I suspect that there 
are many who reject it despite the fact that they have no particular interest 
in philosophy of religion whatsoever. Again, consider those accounts that 
adopt a "Relative-Identity" approach to the Trinity. I agree with Wierenga 
that such accounts qualify as philosophically extreme. And yet, at least in 
their case, their proponents often argue for the need to invoke the notion of 
relative identity in purely non-theological contexts, and hence in contexts 
having nothing whatsoever to do with the Trinity.l1 They may, of course, 
be wrong about the need to invoke relative identity in such contexts (I 
myself think they are). Nonetheless, their attempt to establish this need 
shows that their approach to the Trinity, unlike Wierenga's, can at least 
escape the charge of being entirely ad hoc. 
It seems to me, therefore, that like those accounts that Wierenga criti-
cizes, his own account is guilty of going to extreme lengths to render the 
doctrine of the Trinity coherent. Indeed, by resting his account on a dis-
tinction that is both historically and theologically dubious, as well as philo-
sophically problematic, his account seems to me more extreme in certain 
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ways than the accounts that he criticizes. I realize, of course, that this sort 
of judgment depends on philosophical intuitions about what counts as 
extreme-intuitions that may not be shared by others. Nonetheless, in 
light of what we've already seen, it seems safe to say that, quite apart from 
any theological worries, there are significant philosophical costs associated 
with Wierenga's account. 
III. Social Trinitarianism and its Alternatives 
As Wierenga himself points out, his account of the Trinity is intended to be 
a version of Social Trinitarianism-the view that the persons of the Trinity 
form a society of really distinct divine beings, each member of which has 
its own exemplification of divinity.12 It is no accident, therefore, that the 
sorts of problems I have identified suggest a deeper problem with Social 
Trinitarianism itself. 
Briefly stated, the problem is this. Insofar as Social Trinitarianism is com-
mitted to the existence of three distinct persons each of whom has its own 
divinity, it seems to face a dilemma: it must either draw a distinction like 
Wierenga's between divinity and deity, or not. If it does draw such a distinction, 
it will be able to preserve monotheism of a certain sort (i.e., the existence of a 
single God or deity), but only at the cost of falling into the sorts of theological 
and philosophical problems mentioned above. On the other hand, if it refuses 
to draw such a distinction, then evidently it will be forced to admit that every 
divine being is a God, and hence will fall into some form of polytheism. 
As is well known, Social Trinitarianism is one of two main strategies in 
the contemporary literature for making sense of the Trinity-the other 
being Relative-Identity Theory, which we have already had occasion to 
mention. If these two strategies represented the only strategies for making 
sense of the doctrine, then the force of my criticisms might be mitigated to 
some extent. After all, it might be said that although both of these strate-
gies have their difficulties, Social Trinitarianism is still the better of the two. 
Obviously this is not the place to develop in detail an alternative to the 
standardly recognized approaches to Trinity. Still, since the existence of 
such an alternative is relevant to the evaluation of my criticisms of both 
Wierenga's account of the Trinity and Social Trinitarianism generally-and 
since this alternative strikes me as superior to both its competitors-I will 
conclude by briefly calling attention to its basic outlineY 
As we have seen, the problem of the Trinity stems from its requirement 
that we accept each member of an apparently inconsistent triad: 
(1) There are three really distinct Persons-Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit. 
(2) Each of the Persons is God. 
(3) There is only one God. 
Social Trinitarians and Relative-Identity theorists both solve the problem at 
least in part by denying that the words 'is God' in claims such as (2) mean 
'is absolutely identical with God'. Thus, Social Trinitarians (such as 
Wierenga) take the 'is' in 'is God' to be the 'is' of predication, whereas 
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Relative-Identity theorists take it to be the 'is' of relative identity. The alter-
native that I want to consider provides us with yet another way to read 
such claims, one which takes the 'is' in question to be what we might call 
the 'is' of numerical sameness (without identity). 
Some philosophers, such as Aristotle, have argued that if we are to 
make sense of our ordinary counting practices, especially with respect to 
material objects, we must introduce a form of sameness without identity.14 
Consider a pedestal on which there sits a bronze statue of the Greek god-
dess, Athena, and nothing else. How many objects are there on this 
pedestal? Our common sense intuitions would lead us to count one and 
only one object (since the statue and the lump of bronze of which it is con-
stituted share all the same material parts). And yet our philosophical intu-
itions would lead us to distinguish at least two objects (since the statue and 
the lump of bronze have different essential properties, as is clear from the 
fact that lumps of bronze can survive being melted down and recast, 
whereas statues cannot). According to Aristotle, we can preserve what is 
right about both sets of intuitions if we are prepared to say that the relation 
between material objects and their constituent matter is a variety of numeri-
cal sameness. As he likes to put it, statues and lumps are one in number but 
not one in being-that is, distinct but to be counted as one.15 
No doubt, the idea that there is a form of sameness that falls short of 
identity will strike many, if not most, as highly counterintuitive. Such a 
criticism loses its force, however, once it is recognized that every way of 
explaining our ordinary counting practices involves something equally 
counterintuitive.16 In any case, what is important for our purposes is to rec-
ognize that allowing for numerical sameness without identity provides yet 
another way of resolving the problem of the Trinity--{)ne that is no more 
extreme than the alternatives and has clear advantages over both. Thus, on 
the alternative that I am proposing, the words 'is God' in claims such as (2) 
should be interpreted to mean 'is numerically the same as (but not identi-
cal with) God'. But this by itself provides us with all we need to solve the 
apparent inconsistency of (1 )-(3). For we can now grant that the Persons of 
the Trinity are non-identical, and hence distinct as required by (1); at the 
same time, however, we can also grant that they are each numerically the 
same as the one and only God, and hence that each of them is God and that 
there is only one God, as required by (2) and (3). 
Obviously, much more would have to be said before anything like a 
complete evaluation of this Aristotelian account of the Trinity would be 
possible. But even this brief sketch highlights certain advantages it has 
over its rivals. Unlike Social Trinitarianism, it is clearly compatible with the 
view that there is exactly one divine being or deity (since it entails the exis-
tence of one and only divine being); and unlike Relative-Identity Theory, it 
clearly has application outside the context of the Trinity. Whatever the ulti-
mate verdict, I hope to have presented enough of the account to show that 
the mere rejection of Relative-Identity theory does not by itself require the 
acceptance of Social Trinitarianism, its standardly recognized alternativeY 
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